American ‘normalisation’ in the Middle East: its Achievements and Failures
The Biden administration presided over an extensive process of disentanglement from Middle Eastern affairs. The disengagement was characterised by American diplomatic efforts to establish relationships between Israel and various Gulf states as well as mediating the ‘renormalisation’ of relations and easing of trade relations between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE. At the same time, there were no apparent moves in the direction of kick-starting negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This policy has resulted in an untenable diplomatic position for the US government as it seeks to contain the fallout from the ongoing Israeli invasion of Gaza and war with Hamas.
This article will address the warning signs which were continually swept under the carpet by American policymakers, encapsulated in their pursuit of ‘normalisation’ policies without considering the long-term entrenched tensions which exploded on 7 October 2023 with the Hamas cross-border attack. It will also argue that American disengagement has shifted the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, leaving a vacuum of regional leadership, and any chance of meaningful intervention in the Israel-Hamas war.
A brief history of Normalisation
On 15 September 2020, at a ceremony hosted by US President Donald Trump, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the UAE’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Bin Zayed al-Hahyan, and Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani signed the Abraham Accords. Mediated by the US, the Accord and associated treaties established diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel, and Bahrain and Israel, forming the bedrock of a policy which sought to use American influence to bring together the economic, diplomatic, and political relationships of the Gulf states and Israel, and the wider Arab world where possible (such as with the diplomatic recognition accorded to Israel by Morocco in December 2020). This process inaugurated under Trump and continued by Biden reflects wider American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East.
These included but are not restricted to:
i) Normalisation of relations between the Arab states and Israel.
ii) Re-normalisation of economic and political relations within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
iii) Checking and containing Iran’s influence in the region.
Normalisation sought to build broader economic and political consensus between Israel and various Arab states. The Trump administration brokered four such normalisation agreements. Biden continued this approach, pushing for further agreements with Saudi Arabia, In July 2023 at the Negev Forum, the US worked to promote a broader set of economic and political agreements between Israel and Arab states which included Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, and the UAE. In September 2023, American officials were understood to be finalising Saudi normalisation agreements with Israel. The success of these processes confirmed American assessments that the Gulf states were moving towards seeing regional stability – by improving relations with both Israel and the US - as a prosperous tool to increase their influence. (Krasna, 2021)
Normalisation with Israel often took form as effectively bilateral deals between the US and the Arab states which agreed to take part in the process. As Joshua Krasna notes, under both the Trump and Biden administrations, normalisation with Israel was presented ‘as an American demand and interest.’
Regarding the second objective, within a few days of Biden’s inauguration, the three and a half-year cold war between Qatar/Turkey and Saudi Arabia/UAE ended. Bahrain, UAE, and Egypt lifted their embargo on Qatar after it seemed the embargo’s objectives of halting Qatari economic growth and curtailing the Muslim brotherhood’s influence had failed.
Another aspect of the normalisation drive was to contain Iran’s influence among the Gulf states who viewed the Islamic Republic as an expansionist security threat. American hopes of normalising relations with Iran whilst simultaneously side-lining its influence, seemed remarkably high in early 2023. The resumption of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the UAE suggested a new era of diplomatic reconciliation. (Cornwell, 2023) This was punctuated by the UAE’s return of their ambassador to Iran in August 2022, and the Rapprochement framework signed between Tehran and Riyadh in March 2023 which brought a new hope to the cessation of hostilities and proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia, most notably in Yemen. Gulf leaders including Muhammed Bin Salman were also keen to sign formal foreign defence pacts with the US.
These processes highlighted the potential of normalisation to provide internal stability, promote American interests, and ultimately contain Iran.
The underlying problems
The policy of normalisation was based on several key assumptions and indicators which appeared to represent real signs of de-escalation. However, these signs were presided over by authoritarian regimes often experiencing major economic and political domestic crises. Moreover, normalisation agreements with Israel were and continue to be extremely unpopular among Arab citizens. In November 2022, 76% of Saudi respondents viewed the Abraham Accords negatively, a statistic that has only grown with the Israeli invasion of Gaza. (McKernan, 2023)
Indeed, the Israel-Hamas war has served to expose the frail diplomatic foundation of normalisation. A study published in the journal Foreign Affairs analysed the shift in Tunisian public opinion against establishing relations with Israel.
The rise in public opposition to normalisation with Israel has placed pressure on Arab governments to withdraw from formal agreements. On 2 November 2023, the Bahraini elected parliament issued a statement that diplomatic and economic ties with Israel had been cut following Tel Aviv’s bombardment and invasion of Gaza. The ambiguity of this declaration, given the parliament is not in charge of foreign policy, stirred controversy as it did not seem to reflect government policy but showed rather how these regimes are struggling to quell increasing popular anger. Rapprochement, therefore, cannot be simply understood as driven by a popular consensus which hoped to see an end to entrenched conflicts. An ever-present thorn in the side of American normalisation efforts has been the deteriorating situation in Israel and Palestine. Netanyahu’s government has presided over an accelerated programme to promote the illegal appropriation of Palestinian land on the West Bank. (Michael Robbins, 2023)
This process of Palestinian land dispossession also saw increasing Israeli settler-violence, resulting in a mounting death toll of Palestinians. Increasing tensions and an escalation of violence crystalised a sense of political abandonment among Palestinians and seemed to confirm the disintegration of the Palestinian Authority.
As Zaha Hassan, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues, the US approached the idea of Arab-Israeli normalisation ‘as if the Palestinian issue didn’t exist.’ This resulted in a policy which sought to ignore the Palestinian issue altogether and work as close to Netanyahu’s inner circle of Mossad Chief, Yossi Cohen, Ambassador to the US, Ron Dermer, and National Security Adviser, Meir ben Shabbat. Normalisation in Washington reflected and even ‘sub-contracted’ parts of Israel’s regional policy aims into its own objectives. (Muasher, 2022)
Historically, Jordan and Egypt have been the closest and longest-standing economic and political allies of Israel and the US in the region. However, their notable absence from diplomatic normalisation developments only served to marginalise their role in establishing wider regional stability. This exclusion also strengthened popular calls in both countries to cut ties with Israel, as the Gulf States brokering these agreements seemed to reconfirm the demise of Egyptian and Jordanian influence in the region.
US foreign policy oversight when it came to pushing ahead with normalisation has served Iranian interest and influence in the region. The underlying American assumption when dealing with Iran is to expect that bargains are durable and will be upheld. This approach has ensured that diplomatic ‘breakthroughs’ have only temporarily obscured the reality that Iran continues to work against American interests and influence in the Middle East. Despite increased diplomatic exchange, including the transfer of $6 billion dollars for the release of five American prisoners, Iran has continued to support Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels. (Krasna, 2021) Iran presides over infrastructure which provides intelligence, training, material assistance, and funders for these groups, and they are seen as providing a valuable counterweight to US and Israeli influence in the region.
Normalisation and the Israel-Hamas War
Since the Hamas attack on 7 October, and the subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza, the facade of normalised relationships has seemed to slip away revealing the continued entrenchment of long-term unresolved conflicts. Regional support for Hamas, for instance, has been enhanced, with Iran pressuring Israel’s northern flank via its Hezbollah proxies, while it has been able to draw on broader Arab sympathies from Saudi Arabia to Egypt as civilian casualties in Gaza increase. Meanwhile US intervention and influence seems unable to apply significant pressure on Israel to limit civilian deaths. To many observers, President Biden and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have been powerless to restrain the Israeli military from using disproportionate force in Gaza.
The Biden administration has repeatedly supported the Israeli objective to destroy Hamas but has exercised caution over the protracted nature that this conflict now looks likely to take, and the rising toll of innocent civilian casualties. Moreover, the recent albeit vague revelation that the US aims to revisit the two-state solution between Israel and Palestine seems firmly at odds to the political realities on the ground with polarisation seeming the inevtiable outcome as the death toll grows.
Moreover, the war has the potential to trigger wider regional escalation. Pro-Palestinian sentiment among Arab nations threatens the policy of governments and leaders who have sought to play down the Palestinian issue. Although many of Arab regimes are not responsive to popular attitudes, national protests and internal politics are is pressuring Arab leaders to take a firmer stand against Israel. As it stands, Arab state responses have remained at the diplomatic level in calling for humanitarian ceasefires, but there is also much evidence that the whole US strategy of normalisation is unravelling.
Conclusion
Central to any successful normalisation approach must be the prioritisation of dialogue with and concessions towards Palestinians. American diplomats must pressure the international community to reinvest and reinvigorate a legitimate political authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Whilst US relations with Israel will continue to be close, they must go through a fundamental reappraisal as Tel Aviv ignores Washington’s calls for restraint. American policy must be able to hold Israel to account and prevent periodic invasions of Gaza and the West Bank, thereby protecting against the threat of full-scale regional escalation. (Michael Crowley, 2023) American coalition-building in the Gulf must facilitate a dialogue to establish a new nuclear agreement with Iran and thereby reduce security tensions, rather than use the increased influence of the Arab Gulf states to side-line Iranian interests. Another important starting point for addressing the Saudi-Iranian conflict is the continuation of diplomatic talks even in the context of the Israel Hamas war to facilitate peace in Yemen. In summary, American foreign policy must focus on addressing the underlying tensions and conflicts still at play in the Middle East rather than grasping at surface-level signals of rapprochement in a hope to stabilise the region.
(1) Cornwell, A. (2023). Bahrain seeks to balance anger over Gaza with ties to Israel, US. Reuters.
(2) Krasna, J. (2021). Understanding the wave of normalisation in the Middle East . Foreign Policy Research Institute .
(3) McKernan, B. (2023). Saudi Arabia ‘getting closer’ to normalising relations with Israel, crown prince says. Guardian.
(4) Michael Crowley, V. N. (2023). Saudi Arabia Offers Its Price to Normalize Relations With Israel. New York Times.
(5) Michael Robbins, M. R.-S. (2023). How the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza Is Changing Arab Views. Foreign Affairs.
(6) Muasher, Z. H. (2022). Why the Abraham Accords Fall Short. Foreign Affairs
By Sofia Aujla-Jones
